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INTRODUCTION 
This paper reviews a remarkable experiment in organisation.  At the centre of the story is James G. 
(Jim) March, one of the most influential scholars in management and organisation studies over the 
last half century.  He is best known for his work on organizational decision-making, though he has 
published in the fields of politics, economics, psychology, sociology, leadership and organization 
studies.  From 1954 to 1964, March was a leading member of the Graduate School of 
Administration (GSIA) at the Carnegie Institute of Technology.  GSIA was a truly exceptional 
group of scholars from various disciplines, led by the remarkable and prodigious Herbert Simon.  In 
1964, March was already an academic ‘star’ - even though we was just 36 years old - when he left 
his position as Professor of Industrial Administration and Psychology in the Department of 
Pscychology at GSIA to become Dean of the School of Social Sciences in the new Irvine campus of 
the University of California, which, at that time, had not yet enrolled any students.     
This was a period of intense political debate about inter alia, radical societal change, the nature of 
the University, the organisation of academic work, the Vietnam War, and the direction of American 
society.  In this fluid context, March articulated a clear vision for the new School.  First, he wanted  
it to be interdisciplinary.  Second, March incorporated a large amount of mandatory mathematics 
and statistics in the new undergraduate programmes, on the basis that mathematics provided 
perhaps the only common language that could span the disciplines.  In particular, March advocated 
the mathematical modelling of social behaviourFourth, in line with the wider interest in 
contrarianism and anarchy, March’s vision was that the division should be “conspicuously 
experimental and innovative”.    
This paper provides a detailed processual account of the organisational experiment from the 
inception of March’s vision to its demise.  It draws on interviews with many of the main players - 
including James March, Jean Lave, Duncan Luce, Arnie Binder, William Schonfeld, Mike Cole, 
William Sharpe, Charles Lave, Julian Feldman, Michael Cohen, Kim Romney and John Payne, 
correspondence with others, and a detailed analysis of secondary and archival material.  The story is 
interesting for the following reasons.  First, since March is such an influential figure in management 
and organization studies, it’s worth inquiring into the immediate context out of which the ideas 
associated with him emerged.  Second, this is a case of a keen and skilled student of organization 
getting involved in setting up, running, studying, playing with and leading an organization.  This 
was an interesting and early case where the ‘manager’/’leader’ is a knowledgeable manager leader, 
as indeed, to a lesser extent, were those who are being led/managed.  Many contemporary 
organizations are akin to this in that they are populated with people who have studied organizations.  
We could say it’s an early and extreme case of this phenomenon.  Third, it describes an unusual 
attempt to escape from and work with the powers of an institution.  It is a case study of creativity, 
work, power and play.   
This paper just tells the story, based on my research, and for now I will avoid imposing a theoretical 
frame on the story, though it is surely open to a number of theoretical interpretations. 
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SITUATING THE VISION 
March’s vision was of its time, and therefore we will begin the story by setting the context for the 
Irvine experiment (‘Irvine’ refers to School of Social Sciences rather than the broader university, 
which in some ways was also an experiment)    
The Educational Context 
Immediately before, during and after the Second World War a significant number of European 
scholars migrated to the United States shifting the balance of scholarly power and purpose.  After 
the Manhattan project, it became clear in the United States that university research had played a 
vital role in the war effort and that universities were more than simply teaching institutions.  The 
evidence was that ‘scientific’ research had delivered in spades during the war, creating, what March 
referred to as, “post-World War 2 enthusiasms in social and behavioural science”. Those 
enthusiasms, “relative to other times [both earlier and later], were strongly interdisciplinary, were 
strongly quantitative, strongly ‘scientific’” [Jim March].  Thus the Irvine approach merely 
“reflected …the dominant beliefs of a dominant group of social behavioural scientists at the time” 
[JM].  These beliefs were articulated by those social scientists who were members of the National 
Academy of Science, the Social Science Research Council, the Centre for Advanced Study into 
Behavioural Sciences (CASBS), founded in 1954 in Palo Alto, and the RAND Corporation.  1   
March was well-known within this “relatively small community”’ [JM]; many of them had 
contributed to the Handbook of Organizations (March, 1965) which he edited and to the Handbook 
of Social Psychology (Lindzey, 1956) see March (2007b: 12-13) for development).  Earlier 
institutes and centres also fostered inter-disciplinarity even if they did not share the post-war 
enthusiasm for mathematical analysis of social phenomena.  Particularly influential were Yale’s 
Institute of Human Relations, founded in 1929 around the idea of having physical and social 
scientists working closely together, and Harvard’s Department of Social Relations, another 
innovative, inter-disciplinary collaboration between three social science departments, set up in 
1946.  Yale was important, not least because March obtained a PhD in political science from Yale 
in 1953 (for details on March’s time in Yale, see Augier and March (Augier and Kreiner, 2000)).  
Mike Cole, an early recruit, also came from Yale and for him it “was a more or less faithful attempt 
in continuing [the] sort of inter-disciplinary social science research” pioneered in Yale.  That 
institute, which was the first of its kind in the U.S., was founded by two of Yale’s deans, Robert 
Hutchins of the Law School and Milton Winternitz of the medical school, who subsequently led the 
Institute.  Winternitz was a strong, brilliant and eccentric scholar, and perhaps a role model for 
March himself (Spiro, 2001).  To some of his colleagues he was brilliant, bold, and a ‘steam engine 
in pants,’ and to others he was an insufferable ‘martinet,’ a Napoleon, and an anti-Semite” 
(http://yalemedicine.yale.edu/ym_au01/capsule1.htm ). The Institute was effectively defunct by the 
time Winternitz retired in 1950. 
                                                 
1
 CASBS was one of a number of institutes modeled on the Institute for Advanced Study (IAS) founded in 
Princeton in 1930 as a postdoctoral research institute.  The stated purpose of IAS was to foster the free 
pursuit of learning “to the utmost degree that the facilities of the institution and the ability and faculty of the 
students will permit”.  The idea - which was inspired by All Souls College at Oxford, the Collège de France 
in Paris, and Humbolt’s concept of a research university - was that intellectual exchange across disciplinary 
boundaries, the sine qua non for excellent research, could be achieved if disciplinary experts were collocated 
in a small community.  Other institutes that subsequently modeled themselves on IAS include the 
Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (19xx), the National 
Humanities Centre (1979), the Institute for Advanced Study Berlin (1980), the Swedish Collegium for 
Advanced Study in the Social Sciences (1985), the Collegium Budapest (1992), the International Institute for 
Advanced Studies in the Kansai Culture and Science City, and more recent entities such as the Radcliffe 
Institute for Advanced Study and MIT Media Labs. Common to all of these institutes, and to the School of 
Social Sciences in Irvine, was a commitment to creating a space for the free exchange of ideas, where 
scholarly serendipity, curiosity and contrariness would be respected and fostered. 
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Harvard’s Department of Social Relations was another interdisciplinary collaboration, this time 
among three of Harvard’s social science departments (anthropology, psychology, and sociology).  
Kim Romney, who moved to Irvine in 1966, had trained in Harvard’s Department of Social 
Relations and saw clear parallels between the three experiments in inter-disciplinarity in Harvard, 
Yale and Irvine. March saw Harvard as a ‘different kind of thing’, probably because it lacked a 
commitment to mathematical analysis. Set up in 1946 by Talcott Parsons, it disaggregated into its 
component departments in 1972.  In Romney’s view, “there has been no permanent successful 
experiment to have a multi-disciplinary social science programme anywhere in the world that lasted 
more than 20 years.” Harvard’s Department of Social Relations “lasted about 20 years after the 
original enthusiasm of the original organizers [Talcott Parsons and Gordon Allport]. Those people, 
when they got to retirement time or died, then Harvard reverted back to straight departments. The 
experiment here [in Irvine]… lasted roughly twenty years. It was inevitable that it would became 
departmentalized” [K.Romney] 
The RAND Corporation, located in Santa Monica, just 50 miles north of UC-Irvine, was another 
inter-disciplinary institute of note at the time and it shared and manifest some of the same 
enthusiasms for ‘big science’, mathematical economics, mathematical modelling, systems analysis 
and operations research that also engaged March, Simon, and others.  For instance, Bill Sharpe 
observed that “you could call Jim March an operations research guy, in some senses”.  Julian 
Feldman, who joined Irvine soon after March and who, with March, was a central figure in hiring 
new faculty, had done consulting work for System Development Corporation, a military consulting 
offshoot of RAND, as had other faculty in Irvine (e.g. Arnie Binder, Kathleen Bell and Bill Sharpe), 
while Herbert Simon had spent some summers working there during the 1950s.    
But probably the biggest influence on Irvine was the Graduate School of Industrial Administration 
(GSIA) at the Carnegie Institute of Technology in Pittsburg, which, from 1954 to 1964, was an 
extraordinary hotbed of ideas and research. 2.  The group was led by Herbert Simon, a true 
polymath who is now recognised as a founding father of many scientific domains including 
artificial intelligence, information processing, decision-making, complexity theory and computer 
simulation.  As well as Simon and March, the GSIA group included Richard Cyert, who went on to 
become President of Carnegie-Mellon University, Abraham Charnes, William Cooper, and Charles 
Holt whose work shaped the development of operations research, John Muth and Robert Lucas, 
whose ideas underpin rational expectations economics, Oliver Williamson, who pioneered 
transaction cost economics (and received the Nobel Prize for Economics in 2009), William 
Starbuck, who subsequently became a leader in management and organisational studies (editing 
ASQ at the age of 32), Victor Vroom, who develop the expectancy theory of motivation, Edward 
Prescott, who began his work on the driving forces behind business cycles, Edwin Mansfield who 
pioneered the study of the economics of technology and innovation, Franco Modigliani, who 
formulated influential theories in corporate finance and on savings in the economy, Richard Nelson, 
who published seminal work on evolutionary theories in economics, and Edward Feigenbaum, who 
developed one of the first computer models of  how people learn.  Remarkably, six of the GSIA 
group - which fluctuated in number from 30 in 1955 to about 50 in 1964 - subsequently received 
Nobel Prizes in Economics (Lucas, Miller, Modigliani, Prescott, Simon and Williamson), 10 were 
elected to the US Academy of Sciences (including March) and 15 were elected to the American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences (again including March). 
GSIA also provided the model, rationale and method for a new form of Business School, founded 
on, on the one hand, a strong commitment to research (which emphasised deductive reasoning and 
                                                 
2
 See (Augier and Prietula, 2007) for a good description of the emergence of GSIA, while see (Augier and 
March, 2001; 2002; 2004) for descriptions of Simon and his varied activities in GSIA. Tadajewski (2009) 
presents an insightful description of how Cold War sensibilities affected the School and how, in particular, 
the term ‘behavioural science’ emerged as a more palatable alternative to ‘social science’, which, to some, 
had more than a whiff of socialism.   See (March, 2007a) for a discussion of the longer term impact of GSIA. 
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mathematical modelling) and, on the other, a committment to teaching through the case-method, 
which had already developed at Harvard Business School. Curiously, the case method is essentially 
an inductive epistemology, while mathematical modelling is more of a deductive epistemology.  
For a good articulation of Simon's position see his influential article The business school: A 
problem in organizational design (Simon, 1967). 
A final important factor in the educational context was the large imbalance between the demand for 
university education, which increased rapidly after the Second World War partly due to the G.I. Bill 
- and the supply of faculty, which, of necessity, is difficult to increase quickly. 
The University of California at Irvine 
UC Irvine was appealing to March, not least because the whole University of California system was 
at that time going through an “explicit attempt to experiment with some new forms or state 
sponsored higher education” [Bill Sharpe].  For instance, UC-Riverside implemented the idea of 
mass-producing liberal arts graduates, and they also tried new pedagogical approaches such as 
taking different disciplinary perspectives on a single subject within the one course.  UC-Santa Cruz 
modeled itself on Oxford, having small, residential colleges where students would not receive 
grades.   
These experiments were partly in line with the fashion of the time, probably harking back to the 
19th century fascination with utopian communities.  They were relatively low-risk as well because 
the rapid growth in the population of California during the 1950s was putting pressure on the 
administrators of higher education to quickly increase the capacity in the system.  In 1958, Clark 
Kerr, then President of the University of California, produced a landmark Master Plan for Higher 
Education in California which identified UC as the State’s research institution which would be 
expanded by building four new campuses, one of which was to become UC-Irvine.  Things moved 
rapidly after that (see Instant University by the historian Sam McCulloch for further details on these 
developments (McCulloch, 1996)).  In 1961 L.E. Cox (47) was appointed UCI’s first Vice 
Chancellor for Business & Finance and in January 1962 Kerr appointed Daniel Aldrich (44) as 
Chancellor.  Within months Aldrich had appointed Ivan Hinderaker (46) as VC of Academic 
Affairs and he quickly published “A Provisional Academic Plan” that set out the academic strategy 
for the new campus.  A key element in this strategy was to recruit a mix of senior and junior 
faculty, in contrast to UC-Riverside where mainly junior faculty were hired at the beginning.  
[something about purchase of site and how barren it was] 
In early 1963 a UC Senate Committee visited eight English universities, both new and old, and 
produced an influential report supporting the proposition that the University of California should do 
novel, imaginative things in higher education. 
Aldrich’s strategy was that UC-Irvine should be a general rather than a specialized campus.  By 
July 1964 he had appointed six deans, all under 48, overseeing the following divisions: Biological 
Sciences; Letters & Science; Humanities; Social Sciences; Fine Arts; and the Graduate School of 
Administration.  Soon after these appointments Hinderaker moved to Riverside, and Jack Peltason, 
who had been appointed Dean of Letters & Science, took over as VC for Academic Affairs, which 
meant that there was no Dean of the College of Letters & Science.   
Partly because the university was growing so fast, and partly because there was no Dean of Arts & 
Letters, and partly because of the personalities involved, UCI came to be, in Feldman’s words, a 
“collection of baronies”, where each of the divisions “pretty much worked on their own with 
relatively little regard for the others”.  In practice, and notwithstanding the fashion for inter-
disciplinarity, there wasn’t much interest in inter-disciplinary activities across the campus, though 
March did collaborate with Fred Tonge, director of Irvine’s computer facility.  (In 1965, they 
succeeded in obtaining a grant from Carnegie Corporation to develop new models of student 
instruction in the social sciences.) 
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The national context 
The instability within the University of California system was symptomatic of wider socio-political 
upheavals of the time, which centred around US foreign policy, especially US involvement  in the 
Vietnam war which was escalating in the early 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement (the Civil Rights 
Act was passed in 1964), and a resurgent Feminist Movement (the contraceptive pill was legalised 
in 1961), and a turn to alternative understandings of the human condition (the Esalen Institute 
opened in California in 1962), and a popularisation of radical (often Marxist) critiques of society 
and social science.  There was also, at the time, an emerging hostility towards organization. For 
instance, the Free Speech Movement in the 1960s often cited Paul Goodman, who attacked the 
‘organized system’ proferring a utopian anarchist alternative (Goodman, 1960), while C Wright 
Mill’s The Power Elite was also hugely influential (Mills, 1957). And while March was in Irvine 
new movements emerged, such as the post-structuralist, post-modern worldview and the romantic 
enthusiasm for ‘flower power’ and other countercultures.    
THE SCHOOL UNDER MARCH  (1964-69) 
Jim March 
The central figure in this whole story is undoubtedly Jim March.  March received his BA and MA 
from the University of Wisconsin in 1950 and his PhD from Yale in 1953.  His academic output is 
prodigious including 21 books, eight books of poetry, two films and fourteen honorary doctorates.  
His most famous books include Organizations (with Herbert Simon (1958)) The Behavioural 
Theory of the Firm (with Richard Cyert (1963)).  His most widely cited article is Exploration and 
Exploitation in Organizational Learning (March, 1991) and his ‘garbage can’ article with Mike 
Cohen and Jonah Olsen (Cohen et al., 1972) which have 6223 and 3736 citations in Google 
Scholar, respectively (July 2010).  It is difficult to identify his most important contribution because 
his work is so varied, but he is probably most famous for concepts such as ‘bounded rationality’, 
decision-making in conditions of high ambiguity, his ‘garbage can’ model of decision-making, and 
his distinction between exploration and exploitation.   
March was a strong, extremely intelligent, charismatic individual, as the following selection of 
quotations illustrate.   
“Jim was really charismatic….  He’s a remarkable guy” [Bill Sharpe] 
“If you met Jim March you’d know that he can be an exciting guy, and he communicated that to the 
students” [John Payne] 
“Volney [Stefflre] and Jim knew more about everything than any of us did” [Charles Lave]. 
“I still consider him one of the most creative brilliant academics I have ever known” [John Payne]. 
Even Arnie Binder, who March classed as a “loser” and “particularly disaffected”, reckoned that 
March “is one of the nicest, most honourable men...He was a strong dean. He was a strong 
individual. I say this over and over again, because it’s important since I say so many negative 
things.  Never unpleasent. My animosity is not to him as a person - he’s a very decent, nice man - 
but in terms of his inflexibility, that, maybe more than anything else, I resented. His inflexibility. 
Because I had such brilliant ideas that he rejected!” [Arnie Binder] 
While March sought to manage “unobtrusively”, he well recognised the central position he played 
in the experiment:  “I think some people would describe it as a benevolant despotcy [sic]!” 
March moves to Irvine 
The GSIA group was breaking up in the early 1960s and Irvine offered March a new challenge.  
When Ivan Hinderaker asked March why he agreed to come to Irvine, March replied: “I like to see 
the dirt fly”. Julian Feldman’s recollection is that “we weren’t quite sure why March left that 
environment”, though he speculated that March and his wife had taken a liking to California after 
he had spent some time at the CASBS in Palo Alto 
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In November 1963, just before he joined Irvine, March wrote a letter to Hinderaker in which he set 
out his vision.  The Division (the unit was initially called a Division, before it became a School 
some years later) “should be conspicuously experimental and innovative” with the burden of proof 
“shifted to the existing system. I think there should be major innovations with respect to curricula in 
the social sciences, instructional methods, academic organization, and staffing policies.  The social 
science division should be viewed as an experimental laboratory rather than as primarily a 
production facility.”  His second point was that specialization should be by problem areas rather 
than by traditional academic disciplines, with growth coming through pursuing new specialities 
“rather than by mimicry of standard views on what is subsumed under the terms ‘psychology’, 
‘sociology’”. In short, “faculty should [have] substantial disrespect for traditional disciplinary 
identifications”.  Third, March’s vision that that the division should become a “leader in the 
application of modern techniques for empirical investigation and theory building”, which meant 
that the “social sciences should be heavily laced with mathematics, statistics and computer 
methodology”.  Finally, March was of the view that the division has to take some risks.  “There is 
no serious possibility of becoming a major institution with a conservative strategy”. 
From the other archive material and the interviews, it’s clear that March very much followed 
through on these plans that he set out in 1963.  Interestingly, March didn’t spend much time 
worrying about the graduate program which “didn’t seem to me to be a significant matter” (March 
interview with McCulloch, March 1973). 
Forming the Group 
March’s first appointment, in 1964, was Julian Feldman (34), who had been one of his graduate 
students in GSIA.  Feldman had graduated from GSIA in 1959, joining the faculty in the business 
school in Berkeley.  He was an expert on the computer simulation of human thought and decision-
making, and, with Edward Feigenbaum, he had just published Computers and Thought, the first 
collection of articles about artificial intelligence.  Feldman and March took responsibility for the 
initial round of appointments. 
While Hinderaker had hoped that March would follow a traditional approach, March was insistent 
that the Division of Social Sciences would have no departments because he saw this as necessary if 
the Division was to be  truly inter-disciplinary and innovative.  He was also against using 
disciplinary titles for programmes or positions: “And so we created these fancy titles. I had 
something like “Associate Professor of Psychology and Economics or something like that.  He 
[March] was a Professor or Political Science and Sociology.  Between the two of us we were 
covering four disciplines” [JFeldman]. 
The first group of students were due to arrive in the Fall of 1965, so March and Feldman hired 
about fifteen faculty during that year, including Kathleen Archibald, Duran Bell, Inga Bell, Isabel 
Birnbaum, John Boyd, Myron Braunstein, Gordon Fielding, Barbara Foley, Lewis (Creel) Froman, 
Joseph Hart, Sheen Kassouf, Alan Miller, Deane Nuebauer, Karl Radov, and Martin Shapiro.  Most 
of these were in their early 20s and still hadn’t completed their dissertations. 287 students registered 
with the School of Social Sciences in the Fall of 1965, including 13 graduate students.  Even though 
a departmental structure was not in place, the records shows that the students registered to the 
following disciplines: anthropology (9), economics (39), geography (1), political science (83), 
psychology (61), sociology (30), social sciences (44), undecided (7). In 1966, a further 375 students 
registered, of which 20 were graduate students. More new staff were appointed including, Arnie 
Binder, Charles Cnudde, Lyman Drake, Alan Gross, Mary Key, Jerry Kirk, Charlie Lave, Jean 
Lave, Duane Metzger, Volney Stefflre, and John Wallace.   
This was a remarkable burst of hiring.  While Hinderaker’s plan was that each Division should hire 
a mix of senior and junior staff, March followed the Riverside model by hiring mainly junior 
faculty, for perhaps understandable reasons.  As William Schonfeld, who joined in 1970 recalls: 
“Nothing was here. I mean, these were empty fields; cows were running around, the freeways didn’t 
exist. The question was, who would you get to get involved in the adventure?”  In practice, virtually 
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all the new hires were junior people: “There were a lot of young junior people, energetic..”  (the 
average age of the faculty in 1966 was just 26, with five women in the faculty of 30, which was 
unheard of at that time).  Feldman wasn’t sure why Irvine didn’t attract more senior faculty, but he 
did speculate that the decision not to have departments may have been counter-productive in this 
respect: ”I think that getting senior people fell apart because of the lack of structure. I don’t know.”   
March’s “other point was that the only way to be distinctive was to do something radically 
different; that you could never attract the really good people here if you just did things the way 
everybody else did them” [Arnie Binder].  March made this explicit in a strategy report (November 
1968) to Aldrich: “it seems clear to us that our basic strategy should be to exploit our special 
competences, to develop national preeminence in areas that have not been developed at the major 
institutions and to innovate in new curricula, new procedures, and new organization”.  Elsewhere he 
made the hiring strategy explicit: “Our guiding principle in acquiring future faculty will be to 
appoint people whose area of specialization are particularly conducive to interdisciplinary effort”. 
Here’s March’s retrospective take on these hirings: 
“We discovered fairly early on that hiring into Irvine, first class, first rank people was extremely 
hard. We tried, but they mostly preferred to be at Harvard, Chicago or Berkeley or some place like 
that.  I think mostly our basic strategy was to hire young people and to try to be ahead of the market 
and to take risks – to hire people who had a distinctive interest in playing with ideas; hard to tell, 
we didn’t have very good testing devices for that, so basically we said we’re going to run a strategy 
in which we’ll have more failures that successes, but our successes will look pretty good.   
DK: It was a strategy of letting many flowers bloom? 
JM: Many flowers bloom, but we tried to have standards – flowers that don’t bloom well, you weed 
out. But I think we were a little less successful in doing that.  That was the strategy at least” 
Another issue he mentions in a 1973 interview is that the UC system was inflexible in terms of the 
salaries that could be offered (in contrast to the Stanford, Harvard and Yale systems which 
separates decisions with respect to a person’s rank from decisions with respect to a person’s salary).  
As a result, March was unable to attract the “top 10 or the top 20 in their field”’ because while he 
could offer a professorship he wasn’t able, much to his frustration, to offer a high enough salary.  
(The archives include a very strongly worded letter from March to Hinderaker, dated January 1964, 
in which he complains about the inflexibility of the UC system in terms of salary). 
William Schonfeld took a more political take on the hiring strategy, observing: 
“There are two reasons you can surround yourself with people who can’t challenge you. One reason 
is you’re trying to get the others [senior faculty] and you just can’t quite recruit them. But the other 
is you don’t really try to recruit them and you want to have a dramatic difference between you and 
the rest because that allows you to carry out your experimant in a more unhindered fashion. Since I 
wasn’t here, I don’t know which of those interpretations is correct.”  But Schonfeld is unambiguous 
in his opinion that: “some of the people hired were absolutely outstanding. And some of the people 
were the absolute mirror image of being absolutely outstanding.”  
The hiring process was unusual, even for the time, and certainly in retrospect.  “All appointment 
and promotion cases went before a committee that consisted of all the faculty in social science, and 
there weren’t that many then, plus the senior [non-academic] staff members.  They participated in 
that evaluation which was completely unheard of anywhere” [C Lave].  Some student 
representatives were also on these appointment and promotion committees, including Michael 
Cohen, who joined as a graduate student in 1966 and subsequently co-authored a book with March. 
But neither was it an truly egalitarian system: “[March] was interested in making changes and doing 
things differently but probably not interested in being a long time administrator/manager. Some 
people thought (and I think it was true) that he was not as much of a democrat as some faculty 
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people would like to have - certainly not in terms of consulting people on a point. He pushed 
through some appointments with less than a majority endorsement” [JFeldman]. 
The hiring criterion was relatively straightforward but, in retrospect, unusual: “‘Was this person 
interesting?’ And I think clearly the dominant story was ‘we don’t care whether you have the same 
kind of ideas as we have, as long as we can find your ideas interesting’” [J March].  Almost 
inevitably this eclecticism created an very high level of variety: “as it developed it turned out to be 
a number of people who I would now describe as social constructivists, a number of people who 
turned out to be relatively pure mathematical modelers.  There were some people who became 
committed ethnographers, and you are talking about a range - someone like Bill Sharpe at one end 
was creative and a little bit different, but a financial economist, and then you have people like 
Duane Metzger and Jean Lave at the other end and who were fairly creative, constructivists, post 
modern anthropologists.” [JM].   
Kim Romney, who joined in 1968, opinioned that the variety that emerged was probably 
intentional: “I don’t know whether he made it explicit or not but I think that he also wanted variety. 
High variance. You wouldn’t have people coming out of the same mould.” 
William Schonfeld now takes a somewhat jaundiced view of some of the hiring practices: “The way 
the search committees were constructed - now, I don’t know if March did it quite that way or not - 
the Dean appointed the Chair, announced the committee, and anyone who wanted to joined and 
came to the meetings. One of the early ‘March people’, a fellow named Harvey Sacks, who did 
something called conversational analysis, was an ethnomethodologist. He came to these meetings, 
he was trained as a sociologist and early on one day he comes into a meeting and he announces, “I 
have found someone absolutely spectacular!” I, in my era of raving naivety, asks Harvey, “tell us 
something about the person?”, so he says, “He’s just marvellous! He lives in a caravan!” So I said, 
“ok, tell us something else”. And Harvey said, “I don’t know anything else. But isn’t that 
wonderful?!” The idea that you have someone who either was getting a Ph.D or had a Ph.D and was 
living in a caravan, made them perfect as a recruit, knowing nothing else about them. That’s high 
variance from standard practise”. 
Bill Sharpe, who joined in 1968, gives a faculty perspective on why it was attractive: “Certainly I 
went there - as others - on the ground of Jim’s goals, which were to make it in the image of Jim’s 
work which was rigorous, academic, creative and innovative…Jim’s a brilliant guy, a lot of 
charisma”.   
In 1967, Julian Feldman went on sabbatical for a year, and when he returned he was appointed 
Chair in Information & Computer Science, which meant he was no longer in the Social Sciences 
Division.  In March’s opinion, both Feldman and Binder ended up being “particularly disaffected” 
[email from March to Author, August 2004]. 
Creating the Curriculum 
Notwithstanding March’s hope that “faculty should [have] substantial disrespect for traditional 
disciplinary identifications”, the faculty in the 1965/66 catalogue have conventional titles, e.g. 
Kathleen Archibald was Acting Assistant Professor of Sociology, Duran Bell was Assistant 
Professor of Economics, and courses were offered in disciplines such as anthropology, economics, 
geography, political science, psychology and sociology.  The catalogue says that the programs will 
focus on the systematic empirical observation and quantitative analysis of human behavior” and it 
emphasises the use of computers, the application of mathematics to social sciences, and the 
continued refinement of techniques of inquiry. The focus and rationale for the school is clear from 
this extract from the first catalogue:  
“Important new problems confront society; and social scientists have a responsibility to assist in the 
development of solutions to these problems.  A rapidly changing technology, the pathologies of a 
population explosion and urban concentration, the thrust of once underdeveloped societies, the 
creeping master of disease, the strains of race relations, the tempestuous marriage of men and 
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machines in problem solving, endemic crises in international affairs, lagging or explosive economic 
growth, political instability, and explorations of space provide social scientists with an 
extraordinary list of unsolved problems and opportunities.” 
The catalogue shows the central position given to mathematics in the curriculum (see Table 1).   
 
 Fall Winter Spring 
Freshman Intro to Analysis 
Maths 
Humanities 
English 
Intro to Analysis 
Maths 
Humanities 
English 
Intro to Analysis 
Maths 
Humanities 
Computer Science 
Sophomore Anthro or 
Economics 
Maths 
Natural Science 
Elective 
Political Science or 
Psychology 
Maths 
Natural Science 
Elective 
Geography or 
Sociology 
Maths 
Natural Science 
Elective 
Junior Major Field 
Statistics 
Outside Field 
Elective 
Major Field 
Statistics 
Outside Field 
Elective 
Major Field 
Statistics 
Outside Field 
Elective 
Senior Major Project 
Fine Arts 
Outside Field 
Elective 
Major Project Fine Arts 
 
Table 1:  Curriculum extracted from 1965-66 Catalogue. 
The mathematics requirement imposed on all social science undergraduates was “most unusual”, 
according to Arnie Binder, while Julian Feldman perceived that the requirements in computer 
programming, mathematics and statistics were “controversial”.  Consistent with the fashion of the 
time, maths was perceived to offer a universal language on which inquiry could and indeed had to 
be based, but it also “acts as a screening device for improving the calibre of students who are 
attracted to the social sciences. So far, we seem to be very successful at discouraging anti-scientific 
humanists but only partially successful at attracting potential scientists, who now go into physics, 
chemistry and math” [memo from March to Aldrich, 1968].  This maths requirement was somewhat 
at odds with the hiring strategy: “March hired a lot of people who were not mathematically inclined 
so [the maths requirement] was never…I mean it was held more as a value than as a practise” [Kim 
Romney].  
Another most unusual feature was the notion of just offering one degree, and not offering degrees in 
subjects such as psychology or economics. 
An important, memorable and influential pedagogical innovation was the “Introduction to 
Analysis” course taught by March and many of the other staff.  Initially, March wanted all of the 
faculty to contribute to the course, but many of them were so inexperienced that the took the course 
with the students.  Here, Mike Cohen - who took the course as a student - describes it. 
“The centrepiece of all that was a course called Social Science 1.  March did a lot of the lectures - 
in the early years he did them all; a number of the faculty did them.  The course was taken by all of 
the students, the undergraduates and graduates all had to take it.  I think in the early years the 
faculty also took it.  I recall the very early years; the faculty ran the sections of the courses so 
basically they were taking it with the students.  Then March & Lave produced the text book for it 
[(Lave and March, 1975)].  The text book was also used in high schools.  A beautiful course.  When 
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I got to Michigan, I built a course around the text book. It was taught up until a few years ago with 
a reproduction of the book.  Certainly the most beautiful course on thinking about social life - it had 
a huge effect on me – a way of thinking. 
DK – what was unique about it? 
It managed to convey a creative attitude and aesthetic criteria and a commitment to simultaneously 
holding multiple  perspective on phenomena and I think that’s great training for social science and 
life.  You ended up getting a strong feeling on the course that life is always more complicated than 
your ideas about it, but your ideas can still be useful and illuminating even though they’re not 
perfectly right.” 
Bill Sharpe was one of the faculty who sat in on the course and describes it thus. 
“Jim had a required course, which everybody had to take, which was in effect models and social 
science.  I audited that.  It was brilliant.  He did things like marriage, he had a contagion model; he 
took not just economic issues, but a series of applications, and in each case a model thereof.  There 
was a lot of angst.  He’d get these kids, who took it in their sophomore year; they were do-gooders, 
the social science majors, they were going to go out and save the world.  He made them look at 
each of these problems with models, some equations, some graphs, maybe a computer programme. 
I can’t remember.  There was a lot of no, no, no;  this is not how you do social science.  I don’t 
know if the students liked it.” 
William Schonfeld, who arrived in 1970 and was Dean from 1982 to 2002 was of the opinion that 
“By 1970 that was just another course like every other course”. 
At the graduate level, Mike Cohen explains the procedure: “The basis way the graduate teaching 
programme was explained to students was when you get together three faculties who agree you 
should get a PhD, you get it, period. There were a few more rules than that, but it was basically a 
customised degree plan where you choose a committee.  If you weren’t getting along with some of 
the people, you could change the membership.  It was up to the students to get the committee 
together.” 
William Schonfeld sees this more negatively: 
“Now for some people this worked marvellously well. Michael Cohen who was an early graduate 
student, he’s at Michigan now, was a case in point of someone who prospered under this kind of 
system. Most students admitted into the system became totally lost. I think much the same is true at 
the undergraduate level, where there were a few very bright gifted students who found the capacity 
to circle among the faculty, do lots of independent studies, to be a very positive experience. But the 
bulk of students, for example, basic introductory courses in the separate disciplines were not 
allowed, students were told to read a text book and were then given a multiple choice exam to take.  
A student  decided whether he or she, without any faculty sense as to how you put together a 
programme of study.  A very gifted student might put together an innovative new programme of 
study, but a lot of them just fell through the cracks.” 
The following extract from 1967/68 Catalogue gives a flavour of the pedagogical philosophy: 
“The Division of Social Sciences has no great confidence in a college education that consists solely 
in regular attendance and grades in a specified list of courses, each lasting some multiple of one 
quarter.  As a result, ‘courses’ in the Division do not always resemble the conventional university 
course either in content or in format.  Enrolment in a course is simply a commitment on the part of 
a student that he will educate himself (with such faculty assistance as is required).   
When the education is complete, the course is complete.  Thus, a student may obtain credit through 
examination for any course in the Division for which he is otherwise eligible”. 
The Division emphasized educational innovation, experimenting with variable-length courses, 
content-indeterminate seminars, self-instructional introductory materials, accelerated courses in 
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mathematics for social scientists, critical incident evaluation procedures, and extensive use of 
qualification through competence examination.  The archives include detailed reports on such 
things as whether learning is as good in large as in small classes, on the relationship between a 
student’s Grade Point Average and post-college success, on the factors that correlate with GPA, on 
the effects of College environments on students, etc.  The 1969-70 Catalogue summarises the 
philosophy: “Undergraduate and graduate education in the School of Social Sciences at UCI 
involve participation in an experiment.  The program, faculty and students differ substantially from 
conventional counterparts elsewhere” (p. 115).   
One notable initiative that emerged at the time was the ‘farm school’.  Michael Butler was 
interested in alternate forms of education and so he started an elementary school cum pre-school on 
an old farm on campus. It was “a Programme B kind of a thing …there was this experiment that 
was right on campus, an alternative education” [M Cole]. 
The School also ran a commune from 1968-69, probably the only commune on a state university. In 
many ways, the commune (also known as the farm) was a symbol and reflection of the School and 
what it might become.  March describes it well: 
“It was a charming sort of illustration of the problems of romantics in the real world.  I think to a 
large extent I was their buffer, between them and the world, and they managed to survive. 
DK - During the 19th century there a long tradition of romantic and utopian villages being set up, 
and in some ways it seems to have been a continuation of that 
Absolutely.  One of the conspicuous things was they could never solve the governance problem. 
They could never figure that out. You wanted a system in which no one told anyone what to do, but 
on the other hand you wanted the garbage taken out, and they just never got around to figuring out 
that.  Periodically I would get a phone call saying, essentially, ‘Don’t tell anyone I called, but could 
you please fix this?’ So I would pick up the garbage. 
DK – Was that to do with the commune or more broadly to do with the school? 
In some sense, more broadly it was to do with the school.  The commune, of course was the symbol 
of all of that.  I saw my role in large part as a buffer and, not that I could do it very well, but I tried.  
It’s a fairly common role for somebody.   For me, it was fairly easy to talk to the local military, 
when they got upset about things, try to calm them down; talk to the local townspeople, when they 
got upset, calm them down; talk to the chancellor when he got upset.  That was my role.  It varied in 
size, we didn’t have membership lists, I think the maximum was 80 or so. They built their own 
houses, shacks I suppose.  Some of my best stories were stories about trying to give them agronomy 
help – they fancied themselves being gardeners but they came from a background they didn’t know 
anything about gardening or farming. I as a good mid-Westerner had more knowledge about 
growing corn than they did. I closed it down as one of my last acts as Dean 
DK: Why? 
Because I didn’t think I should leave that as a problem for my successor.  The people that were 
involved were not connected to the university.  They were hangers on in one way or another.  The 
university people who were involved evolved it to a little different structure -  they started a school 
[the farm school].  I think in retrospect it was time to close it down because there was not very 
much outcry or resistance.  The people in it were not socially or politically adept;  there were 
innocents – to be pushed around by me or by others, as long they didn’t trigger a deep ideologically 
strain.  They were injured people.  They hated protection.  Things had run their course by that 
time.” 
Organized Anarchy 
In his 1963 letter to Hinderaker, March highlighted what he saw as the problem with the usual 
model of academic organizations.  “Academic organizations ordinarily combine inflexible central 
control with irrelevant local initiative.  First, the structure is usually exceptionally rigid.  The 
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departments are substantially unchanging over time; they are the same from one university to the 
another.  As a result, subunits tend to become inviolate, individual faculty members tend to be 
linked with a specific subunit in perpetuity, and the university as a whole becomes a loose alliance 
of migratory workers.  Second, typical academic organization overuses ‘legislative’ techniques for 
decision making; it underuses staffwork, consultation and executive decision making.” 
In implementing an alternative, de-differentiated mode of organizing, “March had set it up so that 
there was far more equality among faculty, students and staff than in most universities” [Kim 
Romney]. He clearly emphasised socialization among the faculty.  In particular, the (non-academic) 
staff played a much more important role than was the norm in other universities, with some 
informants observing how “unique” [Romney] it was to have staff, students and faculty socializing 
together. Kim Romney reflects on the unique position of staff in contrast to other institutions at the 
time and in contrast to the current situation: “One of the things that I thought was almost unique 
when I first got here was that it came as a complete shock to me because, at both Stanford and 
Harvard, staff were people who worked for you. They were not ever brought in or consulted, and 
they are no longer consulted about anything here….They were invited to all of the meetings. And 
had a big impact. And their ideas were reflected and they also served as go-betweens and 
communicators, not only to faculty and staff but to graduate students and students. The circle was 
complete”.   
In many ways it worked, especially in the early days.  Romney again: 
“people met in the very beginning, in each others homes as well as in different places on campus. 
That included groups from different disciplines, who really tried to get joint research going. I would 
say that for a period of up to 5 years there was hope that that would make a breakthrough to new 
kinds of research and collaboration. Not unlike what happened in the Harvard Social Relations that 
I saw the early days of”  
The eschewal of formal structure did give the appearance of chaos. According to William Schonfeld 
(who only arrived in 1970 so his perception shouldn’t be extended back into the 1960s), “the only 
rule was, there are no rules”, though Mike Cole, who arrived in 1967, says something similar: 
“There were no rules, and it was as close to a blank slate in an institution as you’re ever going to 
find.”  In his interview, Arnie Binder emphasized the notion of disorganization: “‘disorganization’ 
was a word that was used permanently…it meant that we were certainly never going to have 
departments here, above all; that we’re never going to assign offices according to discipline. So you 
have to have the psychologists here and anthropologists in the next office, and so forth, and the 
interactions had to be so that there were no organizations by disciplinary focus above all… if they 
moved in a direction of what some would call ‘responsible organization’, he [March] would oppose 
it.”.  
Mike Cole recalls that “There was a lot of probably illegal relations between students and teachers, 
there was a lot of drug use, and a lot of alcohol abuse was going on…There were affairs between 
faculty, between couples on faculty, and between faculty and students. So you had these different 
things that would make it seem chaotic.” 
“part of the disorganization was that it seemed like, you know what you’re against but you don’t 
know what you’re for. Literally we would go in on Saturday to see what the hell we were going to 
do on Monday. And we would do that quite regularly” [M Cole]. 
Of course, there were rules, not least the rules of the university regarding tenure, which became 
very real for some of the staff in 1968-69.  And March himself didn’t agree with the proposition 
that the School was rule-less:  
“JM: Rule-less would not be quite right.  We had some fairly strict rules.  Obviously we viewed the 
University of California as having a whole bunch of procedures that got in our way, and we were 
arrogant enough to think that, by and large, we were being ruled by colleagues who were not of the 
quality equal to ours. 
 12
DK: Was this arrogance justified? 
Probably not.  The University of California is a wonderful institution; but there is an awful lot of 
mediocrity in it.” 
March’s suspicion of the academic status quo did not extend to rejecting academic principles of 
rigour, critical thinking, and scholarship.  In particular, he and Volney Stefflre, another charismatic 
figure in the group, consistently attacked the use of jargon, emphasising the importance of clear 
thinking and communication.  March identified Martin Shapiro as another key person in the group: 
“[he] was a very tough-minded, hard-edged student of law and politics.  He had no tolerance of the 
student political radicals, no tolerance of the playful intellectual gamesmanship, but was a very 
important intellectual person to have around.”  Mike Cole remembers when Harvey Sachs “gave a 
talk about how social life is organized around the “not saying” of things. After he talked…Jean 
Lave got up and gave us all a break and said ‘I’ve been sitting here for an hour and a half and so far 
you haven’t said anything at all. Are you planning to say anything in the next hour or so because if 
you’re not I have a lot of work to do!’ It was that kind of place. People would do that”.  Jean Lave 
recounted much the same story but in her version Harold Garfinkel (who was twice hired by the 
School but quickly left both times) was giving the lecture.  In her story, Jim March rowed in as 
well: “I found it very difficult to understand what’s going on and Jim just broke in and said what 
she’s trying to say to you is that you haven’t said anything… It wasn’t me that was rude or if I was 
rude - I don’t care if I was or I wasn’t – but if I was  I was surprised that Jim backed me up by being 
even ruder”.   
Volney Stefflre and Duane Metzger, two charismatic figures within the group, also took a forthright 
approach to inquiry and representation, articulated the principles that all talk across disciplines must 
be in words of one syllable, or at least directly intelligible.  Providing citations to one’s own 
discipline was disallowed, as were similar academic evasions.   
Looking back, March paints it thus: 
 “I think some people would describe it as a benevolent despotcy [sic]!  I don’t think that it was, it 
didn’t have much structure, so in that sense it was democratic, you had to make your case, and 
anyone could make their case, and little subgroups formed, of people who liked to be with each 
other” [JMarch] 
Program A, B and C 
March’s ‘experiment’ was to put about 30 young academics together and then see how they might 
organise without replicating existing structures, or as Mike Cole recalls it: “we created this rule that 
you cannot create an academic unit which was identifiable with an existing discipline [like 
sociology, anthropology or economics]”.  Out of this mix, three groupings emerged, which, in 1967, 
came to be named as Program A, Program B and Program C.   
Program A, sometimes referred to as ‘Formal Models’ or, more officially, the “Program of 
Mathematical and Computer Models in the Behavioral Sciences”,  followed through on the GSIA 
work, and the maths and computer programming requirements placed on the students was in 
harmony with the philosophy of this group. By 1968, Program A consisted of economists, an 
engineer, psychologists, and computer science specialists.   
Program B was sometimes known as ‘Language and Development’.  This group included what 
would be recognised as anthropologists, sociologists, and social psychologists.  It sought “to 
provide sufficient understanding of complex cultural phenomena to produce significant cultural 
change [and to develop an] understanding of individual and small group behavior, as well as 
national, macro-level behavior.” [March’s report to Aldrich, Nov. 1968].  In practice, this group 
divided into two or three sub-groups, though the membership and identity was fluid.  One sub-
group focused on language and behaviour and the members included Isabel Birnbaum (a 
psychologist interested in learning and retention), John Boyd (a communication scientists interested 
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in mathematical models of kinship and bargaining behaviour), Doug Chalmers (a psychologist 
interested in psycholinguistics and learning), Nick Colby (an anthropologist interested in change 
and development in an Indian community in Guatemala),  Mike Cole (a psychologist interested in 
mathematical models of learning in animals and humans), Joseph Hart (a psychologist interested in 
awareness), Duane Metzger (an anthropologist interested in exotic beliefs), Harvey Sacks (a 
sociologist interested in the sociological organisation of conversation ), Volney Stefflre (a 
psychologist interested in relations between language and behaviour), Dave Sudnow (a sociologist 
interested in non-verbal behaviour), and Ken Wexler (a psychologist interested in 
psycholinguistics). Another sub-group, with some overlap in membership, focused on 
‘Development and Change’ and the members of this sub-group included Mike Butler (Social 
Science; the sociology of the Mexican intelligentsia), Mike Cole (Culture & education), Jerry Kirk 
(Sociology; social foundations of collective innovation), Charlie Lave (Economics; quantitative 
economic history, transportation economics), Jean Lave (Anthropology; comparative studies of 
social structure), Kim Romney (Anthropology; change and development in Mexico), Volney 
Stefflre (language and behaviour).  This group intended to undertake a large-scale interdisciplinary 
research project.  The group’s students had already participated in field studies in Mexico, Liberia, 
Samoa and Brazil and native informants from Mexico and Samoa had been brought to the campus 
to work with the students.   
Finally, Program C was “is a residual category for those faculty members in the Division who are 
not members of either program but hold appointments in the Division” (memo from March to 
Aldrich, June 1967). It was “the set of those not belonging to any set” (Lave, 2009).  It appears that 
the Social Ecology group, led by Arnie Binder, emerged out of Program C. 
Jean Lave perceived a further group - the ethnomethodologists - who were outside of this A, B, C 
structure.  One could be a member of one or more groups and move between groups. Once a year 
each faculty member had to declare whether he or she would be in a program or not, which, 
according to Jean Lave, was “a pretty serious business.  You had to make a positive move to declare 
your intentions.  Programs really did cut across academic disciplines.  They absolutely violated 
standard divisions between disciplines”. 
Froman and Metzger were appointed as Program Directors for B and C, respectively. Notifying 
Aldrich about these appointments, March stated “Their general responsibilities are essentially 
equivalent to those of Departmental Chairmen in other divisions. They should be included on your 
mailing lists of Departmental Chairmen, and should be accorded all the rights, love and aggression 
normally associated with such offices” [memo from March to Aldrich, June 1967]. 
Notwithstanding these internal groupings, the primary social science subject that Irvine came to be 
known for externally was political science, because “we had March who had in PhD in political 
science from Yale, you had Peltason who had a reputation of constitutional law and Dick Snyder 
who was the Dean of the Graduate School of Administration, was also a very well known political 
scientist in addition to young people” [JFeldman].  (Even though March was the only person in the 
Social Science Division).   
DISRUPTIONS 
Social Ecology 
The tensions within the group developed, culminating in a number of significant leavings.  The first 
major issue centred on Arnie Binder, who joined the group in 1966 and whose field of interest was 
mathematical psychology. Even though this was an abstract subject, Binder had received research 
grants for two research projects that dealt with applied community problems, one on accident 
prevention and another on biometeorology. As a result he became more interested in research that 
would have more direct social benefits -  “that led me to think of social ecology”.  By 1968, Binder 
had proposed a “Program in Social Analysis” and March included this in his report of that year to 
Aldrich. This program, which March presented as just a proposal, “centers on the very problems 
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which society presents for solution. e.g. 1. urban development, etc. 2. community mental health; 3. 
riots and unrest; 4. injury control in home and highways”.  March proposed that Arnie Binder 
would be allocated to this full-time along with three part-time faculty.  However, “within 2 weeks 
he [March] withdrew [his support] and said he had just made a mistake in giving initial support” [A 
Binder].  Binder was clearly disaffected and worked to split off from the School of Social Sciences 
a new independent unit/program. This he eventually set up in 1970, after March had left Irvine.  
Binder’s unit and  program was called “Social Ecology”, and, curiously, it mirrored much of 
March’s interest in the interdisciplinary study of social problems.  Twelve faculty were aligned with 
the program when it opened in 1970, and it attracted 113 undergraduate students that year.  The 
program in Sociol Ecology continued to increase in size over the years. By 1981 there were 685 
undergraduates and 57 graduate students in the program, increasing to 1320 and 117 by 1992.  For 
further details on the School of Social Ecology see Binder (1972) and 
http://socialecology.uci.edu/pages/conceptual-social-ecology . 
March leaves 
In November 1968, March produced a ‘planning report’ for Chancellor Aldrich, in which he 
identified three developments that he felt would have a significant impact. First, an increasing 
concern with quantification and formal theorizing (i.e. amenable to mathematical representation 
and/or computer simulation).  Second, substantial elements of borrowing (or convergence) among 
the social sciences, hence inter-disciplinarity and disorganisation were celebrated. Third, concern 
with the application of social sciences, which meant a return to ‘applied problems’.  March’s vision 
was positivist in so far as “we assume a theoretical model is valid only if it predicts the kinds of 
changes actually produced”. 
“There is a pervasive sense at UCI of new beginnings, youth, enthusiasm, flexibility and 
innovation. We intend to sustain these qualities by anticipating growth and change in the 
University, and making, organizational arrangements to insure maximum flexibility and 
revolutionary character in the long run” [from the same report]. 
In the report he reaffirmed his committment to inter-disciplinarity:  “SSS has been organized to 
facilitate the integration of research and teaching activities around the concept that the most crucial 
and exciting work in the social sciences is that which is interdisciplinary in nature.” 
And he ends the letter accompanying his report with typical quip: “I hope that things continue to be 
unstable enough so that neither one of us will really know what is going on”.  
Within a few months, March informed the faculty that he was leaving Irvine to take up a 
professorial position in Stanford.  Stanford was clearly a more prestigious university than Irvine and 
it meant that he could continue his career as a research professor-cum teacher rather than become a 
university administrator. He has remained in Stanford ever since. 
When I asked March why he left, he answered: “The glib answer is that parents should allow their 
children to grow up. I think as long as I was around it was relatively difficult for individuals to 
escape from attending to me”. March also “didn’t want to be a College President and having made 
that decision the issue was where could I do my work best. But from Irvine’s point of view I felt the 
School would develop better without me than with me”.  John Payne, who was a student at the time 
took the view that “every leader somehow wears out his welcome but everyone had a great respect 
for Jim March.  I still do.”  Charles Lave, mused as follows:  “I hope there was little of the idea that 
‘Well, it was neat idea but it has failed, so move on’. But you know you always suspect that.” 
March’s leaving was devastating to the group:  “..the major incident is Jim leaving, and that was 
significant because the guy who brought us here and was our intellectual leader was all of a sudden 
saying that he didn’t love us anymore….When the person who left, the kind of father figure, left, 
that created a disappointment…” [C Lave].  “His leading left a big vacuum” [Kim Romney].  “One 
of the things that I was very unhappy about was March leaving when he did. I thought he’d stirred 
 15
the pot and then just walked away from it. I mean I’m sure Jim has a different story about that. But 
then I followed.” [M Cole].   
But in his interview, March distanced himself from the trauma: “There were a number of traumatic 
things associated with [my leaving], but not particularly my leaving.  My leaving necessitated some 
decisions which articulated some of the differences that were suppressed by my presence, I 
suppose”.   
Bill Sharpe presents a good picture of this wider trauma.  Sharpe observed that the hostility that the 
group held to the status quo had a number of, probably unintended, consequences.  One important 
issue, which was a corollary of the assumption that disciplinary is bad and inter-disciplinary is 
good, was the position held by some in the School that “all academic journals of consequence are in 
the hands of the disciplines, so therefore publishing in one of them is bad, [and so] we won’t”.  This 
led to something of a crisis in 1968 when many members of the group were coming up to their ‘up 
or out’ tenure reviews. “The way the University of California operated, a campus that was new and 
fresh might not have enough senior faculty in a particular discipline to do a review, especially a 
tenure review, so they would bring in some faculty from some other universities in the system.  A 
lot of review committees said ‘How can you promote this person?’ And there was a group that lived 
in a house – an old farm house – and engaged in – I think they grew pot and they certainly used it – 
I was sympathetic to them, I was counter-culture, sympathetic not active – it was a pretty free-
wheeling operation out there. So the problem came, at one point Jim said ‘I am going to get these 
people through, they put their faith in me, they did what I thought they should do, I’ve got to find 
some way to keep them from being canned’.  Then came a point when he said ‘I can’t really give 
tenure to these people as they really haven’t done anything that advances the state of the knowledge 
particularly’, and then he said he was going to resign as Dean, and then he said he was not, ‘because 
I am going to stay on to try and get these people through the system”, then he resigned after all.  
Jim was very conflicted. But most of us who wanted to do rigorous modelling, theoretical 
mathematics within our disciplines or even across disciplines were disappointed and really didn’t 
feel that this was going to be a place that we’d be happy in. So a fair number of us left. I certainly 
did.”  Soon after March left Sharpe also moved to Stanford.   
According to Kim Romney, “the economists wanted to departmentalize and I think Bill Sharpe left 
because Economics didn’t get independence as a department”.  Bill Sharpe was probably never as 
intensely engaged with the experiment as others, and tended to view it from a distance.  For 
instance, in his interview he didn’t recall the Program A-B-C groupings at all: “I kind of dropped 
out. In my second year I taught my courses, I didn’t participate very much.” Similarly, March is 
adamant that while Sharpe and Shapiro “were not part of the play group” they “were not 
antagonistic, in that they didn’t want to eliminate it” and left simply because “they had good 
opportunities”.  Perhaps fittingly or ironically, while Sharp wasn’t enthusiastic about much of what 
was going on in Irvine, he was one of the originators of the inter-disciplinary field of financial 
economics, for which he received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1990. 
Post- March  
When March left everything went into flux and there was quite a bit of controversy.  Johan Olsen, 
who subsequently wrote three books with March as well as the ‘garbage can’ paper with March and 
Cohen,  was a research fellow in the School of Social Sciences in 1968-69 and closely observed the 
decision-making process involved in appointing March’s replacement.  Olsen published two reports 
on what happened (Olsen, 1970; 1971) and he also wrote a book chapter which used the case study 
to show how far from theory the practice of decision-making can be (Olsen, [1976] 1979).  At the 
end of quite a tortured and painful process, Kim Romney, who had joined the School in 1968 was 
appointed as Dean.  Mike Cole promptly left: “The decision about the Dean was really a decision 
which went for stability and standard social science. That put an end to the whole thing. And I 
walked away from it” [Mike Cole].  Others, like Bill Sharpe, left as well, if not for the same reason.  
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And Arnie Binder then took the opportunity to create a new unit, called the School of Social 
Ecology, bringing staff and students away from the School of Social Sciences.   
Kim Romney was Dean from 1970 to 1972, at which point Lewis (Creel) Froman became Dean. 
The following quotations give a sense of the time: 
 “I mean he was a kind of anarchist and he was opposing the Marchian ideology and he was anti-
quantitative. But he was one of the original people and he started out as a hard-headed quantitative 
political scientist and he eventually began teaching courses whose essence was…well, what does it 
matter anyway? A brilliant guy. He became an anarchist” [C Lave].   
“Creel Froman didn’t have a strongly defined sense of direction, I’d don’t think. He got other 
interests over time and the school started to drift and not know exactly what it was doing” [Kim 
Romney] 
“He made a total change in his social science philosophy while at Irvine. The third year I was 
working with him, I went into his office and he'd given away all his books, as he no longer believed 
what was in them. What was left was one shelf, mostly literary criticism such as Kenneth 
Burke.…He became quite a difficult person during his ‘transformation’. I was surprised actually 
that he became Dean since his views of much traditional social science became pretty negative, and 
he was inclined to act on what he thought…I think he was pretty disappointed in me... I regret it, as 
I learned a lot from him and respected his courage of his convictions” [M Cohen]. 
According to Charles Lave, Froman was eventually ‘deposed’ in 1975 to be replaced by Christian 
Werner who was Dean up to 1979, followed by Linton Freeman (1980-81).  While I have not 
collected much data on the School during the 1970s, my general sense is that it was a period of drift 
and emptiness.  Some of the spirit and excitement of the 1960s remained, but the overwhelming 
sense seems to be one of disappointment, resentment, and loss. 
In 1982 William Schonfeld, who arrived in 1970 when March was leaving, was appointed as Dean 
and he continued in this position for twenty years.  Schonfeld has a fairly negative perspective on 
the School of Social Sciences under March’s leadership: “It was at every level a game being played 
with other people’s lives. You could draw that as a conclusion – I think there was an ugly quality to 
what they did because of exactly that. None of us had a right to play games with other human 
beings. We have a right to found institutions on the basis of principles in which we believe. We 
don’t have a right to take other people and throw them out there and see what they do”.  During the 
1980s, Schonfeld effectively dismantled the original structure putting in place a conventional social 
science departmental structure.   
LOOKING BACK 
Almost all of those I interviewed look back on those days with fondness, though it’s important to 
emphasise that the people I interviewed were those who remained in and were successful in 
academia.   
“In retrospect, I cherish those memories and those days. They were very heady days” - [Kim 
Romney] 
“I didn’t regret a moment the time I spent there.”  [M Cole] 
Jim March felt that that the greatest successes were “spiritual.  I think that we constructed a culture, 
at least among the faculty… that we were able to exhibit the possiblity of having a non-
departmentalized structure and exhibit the possibility of having a fairly significant quantitative 
undergraduate program, a kind of what I call organized anarchy, an organizational style that 
involved a lot of spontaneous coordination, an unobtrusive coordination rather than a formal 
structural coordination that was feasible, but not easy.”   
“my saddest feelings about Irvine was that we never built, while I was there, a campus community.  
The level of discomfort with one another among the faculty and the level of acrimony among the 
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faculty, not only within the School of Social Science but collectively on the campus, the level of 
pettiness on the campus was just way above what it should have been… Ordinary decency and 
ordinary elements of human life were somehow driven out….Part of the socialization process and 
part of the missionary zeal produced a kind of snottiness and a kind of cockiness and a kind of 
maybe indifference to other people that I don’t think I intended to communicate, but I think it got 
built into that culture”.  
“The one major administrative thing is that I did not educate the faculty to the administrative facts 
of life…. They were allowed a kind of deceptive irresponsibility; they were being covered.” 
[March, interviewed in 1973]. 
Jean Lave notes the irony of being “a delighted, enthusiastic participant in its collective search for 
interdisciplinary unity via a mathematical language, empirical modeling and anti-historical, anti-
social-theoretical stance, and [yet] end up today working within a historical, materialist theoretical 
problematic” (Lave, 2009). 
Bill Sharpe recalls as follows: “There was not enough of a coherent notion of what a truly inter-
disciplinary group could do.   It veered off, which I think was partly contagion from the cultural 
situation at that time, into being so virulently anti-establishment it partly threw out the ideas of 
doing serious research, testing and peer review, what have you…. it was a sort of flower child 
mentality…I characterised it to others as ‘it was a really interesting experiment, but unfortunately 
all the rats died’”.  
“Things that are easy for me to say are unconditionally I enjoyed it” [Jim March]. 
While many of the Faculty may have shared March’s enjoyment, William Schonfeld’s take is that it 
wasn’t attractive to the students: 
“No, there were not many students, that is to say the Department of Social Sciences were not 
acquiring their normal share of students. I guess you could go back and find out statistically today 
at UCI,  the school of Social Sciences graduate 38% of the undergraduate student body. My guess 
it, and it’s a pure guess, that in 1970, the School of Social Sciences graduated 8%. [My data is that 
the current figure is 25% in 2010 compared with 14% in 1970.  Schonfeld may be including 
students from the School of Social Ecology in his 38%].  That is to say that one of the consequnces 
was that since most students got lost they went elsewhere, including going over to Social Ecology 
which became an alternative programme and Binder …certainly understood those frustrations.”  
“It was an experiment. But it was an experiment by an experimentor who was playing with the 
faculty who were hired, which is not the best form of experiment” [W Schonfeld]. 
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